We study approximation algorithms for graph pricing with vertex capacities yet without the traditional envy-free constraint. Specifically, we have a set of items V and a set of customers X where each customer i ∈ X has a budget b i and is interested in a bundle of items S i ⊆ V with |S i | ≤ 2. However, there is a limited supply of each item: we only have µ v copies of item v to sell for each v ∈ V . We should assign prices p(v) to each v ∈ V and chose a subset Y ⊆ X of customers so that each i ∈ Y can afford their bundle (p(S i ) ≤ b i ) and at most µ v chosen customers have item v in their bundle for each item v ∈ V . Each customer i ∈ Y pays p(S i ) for the bundle they purchased: our goal is to do this in a way that maximizes revenue. Such pricing problems have been studied from the perspective of envy-freeness where we also must ensure that p(S i ) ≥ b i for each i / ∈ Y . However, the version where we simply allocate items to customers after setting prices and do not worry about the envy-free condition has received less attention.
+ -approximation. We also give a (4 + )-approximation in simple graphs through LP rounding when all capacities are very large as a function of .
We use a reduction by Balcan and Blum to the case of bipartite graphs where all items on one side must be assigned a price of 0 holds in this setting as well. However, unlike their setting, the resulting problem remains APX-hard even if all items have at most 4 copies to sell. We also show our multi-swap analysis is tight using an interesting construction based on regular, high-girth graphs.
Introduction
Choosing prices to sell items in order to maximize revenue is a complicated task even in environments where one can be certain of customer behaviour. Indeed, many so-called pricing problems have been studied in combinatorial optimization. One popular setting is this: a collection of items V is available to be sold where we have µ v ∈ Z ≥0 ∪ {∞} copies of item v ∈ V . Additionally, we are given a collection of customers X where each i ∈ X has some budget b i ≥ 0. In the single-minded setting, each customer i ∈ X is interested in a bundle S i ⊆ V . We must assign prices p : V → R ≥0 to the items and sell them to some customers Y ⊆ X while respecting two constraints:
• Affordability: p(S i ) := v∈S i p(v) ≤ b i for i ∈ Y , and
That is, each customer that is allocated their bundle can afford it and no item is oversold. Such a solution (p, Y ) is said to be feasible, and the goal is to find a feasible (p, Y ) maximizing revenue, i.e. i∈Y p(S i ).
Much attention has been given to the envy-free setting, where a feasible solution must additionally satisfy the property p(S i ) ≥ b i for i / ∈ Y or to the unlimited supply setting where µ v = ∞ for each v ∈ V . Observe that in the unlimited supply setting, any pricing yields an envy-free solution by simply choosing the customers that can afford the price. However, the problem still remains hard in the setting with unlimited supply of each item, see the related works section.
The single-minded, envy-free pricing (SMEFP) problem with limited supply was studied by Cheung and Swamy [7] . Somewhat informally, they show the following. If there is an LPbased α-approximation to the problem of choosing the best customers Y when given prices p (without regard to the envy-free condition), then there is an O(α · log C)-approximation to SMEFP where C = max v∈V µ v . In the special case where |S i | is bounded by a constant for each i ∈ X, this yields a logarithmic approximation for SMEFP.
We study single-minded pricing problems yet without the envy-free constraint. This is a natural variant of pricing problems where customer satisfaction is less of a concern than overall revenue generation. To the best of our knowledge, it seems that pricing problems without the envy-free condition like this have received virtually no attention so far except in simpler cases of unlimited supply where envy-freeness is a superfluous constraint (i.e. any solution can be trivially be made envy-free without losing revenue).
More specifically we mainly consider the case when |S i | = 2 for each customer i. Here, the set of customers can be thought of as edges E in a graph G = (V, E) with vertex capacities indicating the number of copies of the item/vertex that can be sold. We show that without the envy-free condition, the problem admits a constant-factor approximation. In fact, it is relatively easy to get a 16-approximation using randomized rounding (with alterations) of an LP relaxation. Our primary focus is on obtaining smaller constants through a more intricate local search approximation algorithm. We also show how a combined approach using linear programming and local search can yield even better approximations in certain settings.
Our Results
We use shorthand notation like e = uv ∈ E when we want to consider an edge e ∈ E in some graph G = (V, E) and also want name the endpoints u, v of e. This allows us to name distinct customers (i.e. e) who are interested in the same bundle of items (i.e. {u, v}). As mentioned earlier, we focus on the following problem. Definition 1. Let G = (V, E) be a graph with vertex capacities µ v ∈ Z ≥0 ∪ {∞} where each e = uv ∈ E has a budget b e ≥ 0 and is interested in the bundle of vertices {u, v}. In Capacitated Graph Pricing, we want to find a pricing p : V → R ≥0 and F ⊆ E such that (p, F ) is a feasible solution to the pricing problem. The goal is to maximize revenue:
All of our algorithmic results extend in a simple way to the case where each customer is interested in a bundle of size at most 2, but it is slightly simpler to describe the algorithms and their analysis for the case where each customer wants precisely two different items. Unless otherwise stated, the graph G may have parallel edges. We use the term simple graph to indicate it does not have parallel edges, meaning no two customers want exactly the same bundle.
To get approximations for Capacitated Graph Pricing, we use the reduction from Balcan and Blum [3] to reduce to the case of a bipartite graph where all items on one side must be given a price of 0. Specifically, we consider the following problem.
Definition 2.
In L-Sided Pricing, we are given a Capacitated Graph Pricing instance in a bipartite graph (L ∪ R, E). A feasible solution (p, F ) must also have p(v) = 0 for each v ∈ R.
Though they only focused on uncapacitated pricing problems, the reduction in [3] easily shows an α-approximation for L-Sided Pricing yields a 4α-approximation for Capacitated Graph Pricing. We remark that the reduction would not be valid if one were looking for envy-free solutions. A key difference between the uncapacitated case studied in [3] and the capacitated case we work with is that L-Sided Pricing remains hard if there are capacities. Theorem 1. L-Sided Pricing is APX-hard, even if all capacities are at most 4 and all customers have a budget of 1 or 2.
So we turn to approximation algorithms. It is possible to get a 4-approximation for L-Sided Pricing through straightforward rounding of a natural linear programming relaxation that is presented in Section 5, thus leading to a 16-approximation for Capacitated Graph Pricing overall. We consider an alternative approach to get better approximation guarantees.
Our main algorithmic results are summarized as follows.
Theorem 2. There is a polynomial-time 2-approximation for L-Sided Pricing.
This 2-approximation is fairly simple to obtain using local search. But we think it nicely highlights a direction for to designing approximations for pricing+packing problems.
We obtain slightly improved bounds in simple graphs with uniform capacities.
Theorem 3. Instances of L-Sided Pricing in simple graphs where all vertices in L ∪ R have the same capacity µ admit a randomized, polynomial-time 1.952381-approximation.
For Capacitated Graph Pricing, this yields a 7.8096-approximation. This is obtained through a hybrid of local-search techniques and LP rounding techniques: if µ is bounded by some appropriate constant then a multi-swap local search algorithm is used, otherwise we use a randomized LP rounding approach.
For the first part, we consider a more involved algorithm for L-Sided Pricing with bounded capacities (that need not be uniform).
Theorem 4. For any constants
Note this does not require any bounds on capacities for nodes in R. For example with C = 2 this yields a (1.5 + )-approximation and in the case we prove is APX-hard (C = 4) this yields a (1.75 + )-approximation. Observe if C = 1 then both Capacitated Graph Pricing and L-Sided Pricing reduce to maximum-weight matching because we can easily set prices to match the full budget of all edges in any matching.
Theorems 2 and 4 are proven using local search algorithms. That is, if we are given prices p : L → R ≥0 then the optimal customers F ⊆ E can be computed using a maximumweight µ-matching algorithm. The local search algorithm for Theorem 2 iteratively tries to change the price of one item in L to see if it yields a better matching. We prove with a simple argument that a local optimum is a 2-approximate solution for L-Sided Pricing.
To prove Theorem 4, we consider a local search algorithm that changes O ,C (1) prices at a time in each step. To analyze the performance of such an algorithm, we need a result about covering directed graphs by directed balls in a uniform way. This may be of independent interest in other settings, so we state it here.
Let H = (L, F ) be a directed graph. For any u ∈ L and r ≥ 0 consider the "directed ball" B + (u, r) = {v ∈ L : d H (u, v) ≤ r} of nodes in L reachable from u in at most r steps. Similarly, let ∂B + (u, r) = {v ∈ L : d(u, v) = r} be nodes v such that the shortest u − v path in H has length exactly r (the boundary of B + (u, r)). We prove the following covering result for directed graphs.
Theorem 5. Let H = (L, F ) be a directed graph where the indegree of each node is at most C and let d ∈ Z ≥0 . There is a "weighting" of directed balls τ : L × {0, 1, . . . , d} → Z ≥0 with the following properties:
That is, each v ∈ L lies in these balls with weight precisely C d+1 −1 C−1 and appears on the boundary of the balls with weight precisely C d . The bound on τ (u, r) at the end of the statement is a required to ensure the local search algorithm used to prove Theorem 4 runs in polynomial time.
We also show the analysis of both algorithms are tight. See Section 3 for definitions of the two local search algorithms mentioned in the results below and Section 4 for precise statements of how the analysis is tight. Slightly informal statements of the results are mentioned here. Theorem 6. For any > 0, the locality gap of the single-swap algorithm (Algorithm 1) can be as bad as 2 − . Theorem 7. For any C ≥ 2, ρ ≥ 1, > 0, the locality gap of the ρ-swap algorithm (Algorithm 3) on L-Sided Pricing instances having maximum capacity at most C can be as bad as 2C−1 C − The first construction is quite simple, but the second construction for the multi-swap analysis is much more involved. As a starting point for the construction, we require simple, regular graphs of constant degree but arbitrarily large girth. Such graphs were shown to exist by Sachs [18] .
Instances of L-Sided Pricing satisfying µ v = ∞ for v ∈ R can be solved in polynomial time by a greedy algorithm that simply chooses the best price at each vertex: customers incident to different vertices in L have no interaction [3] . So it is natural to wonder if we can get better approximations if capacities are large. Though it is not our main result, we confirm the intuition that larger capacities yield better approximations (in simple graphs) through randomized rounding of an LP relaxation.
Theorem 8. For any > 0, there is some C ≥ 0 such that instances of Capacitated Graph Pricing in simple graphs satisfying µ v ≥ C admit a randomized, polynomial-time (4 + )-approximation.
Related Work
The basic model of pricing problems of this sort were introduced by Guruswami et al. [13] . Among other results, they give an O(log n + log m)-approximation for the case of single-minded pricing without item capacities if we have n items and m customers. Here, the bundle S i for each customer i may be any subset of items (not just size 2). This was later improved by Briest and Krysta to an O(log D + log k)-approximation where each set has size at most k and each item appears in at most D sets [4] . The logarithmic approximation is essentially tight: Chalermsook et al. show for any constant > 0 there is no O(log 1− (m + n))-approximation unless NP ⊆ DTIME(n polylog(n) ) [5] .
If all customers are interested in a set of size at most k, Balcan and Blum give an O(k)approximation which specializes to a 4-approximation in the case k = 2 [3] . Amazingly, this may also be tight: building on work by Khadekar et al. [15] , Lee showed that there is no (4 − )-approximation when k = 2 for any constant > 0 unless the Unique Games conjecture fails [16] .
Cheung and Swamy studied the envy-free variant of capacitated pricing problems [7] . As mentioned earlier, they show that LP-based approximations that choose the maximumprofit set of customers for given prices translate to approximation algorithms for envy-free pricing with capacities while losing an O(log µ max )-factor. In particular, for envy-free Capacitated Graph Pricing they get an O(log µ max )-approximation.
Other variants of envy-free pricing problems have been studied, we do not attempt to comprehensively survey all such models and just sample a few to discuss. For example, it could be that each customer is interested in acquiring just a single item from their subset (rather than all items). This was also studied in [13] and follow-up work (eg. [9] ). Other directions have considered more restricted subsets of items in single-minded pricing, for example the customers may be interested in the edges of a subpath of a large path (the highway problem) or subpaths of a tree (the tollbooth problem). See [12] and [11] for definitions and state-of-the-art approximations for these problems.
Organization
Section 2 introduces notation and discusses the reduction from Capacitated Graph Pricing to L-Sided Pricing. Section 3 gives the local search algorithms to prove Theorems 2 and 4. The tightness of the analysis of these local search algorithms is presented in Section 4. The randomized LP rounding algorithms and, ultimately, the proof of Theorem 3 appears in Section 5. The APX-hardness proof appears in 6.
Preliminaries
We consider graphs that may have parallel edges, unless we explicitly specify otherwise. We do not consider loops. It is easy to extend our result to cases where some customers may only be interested a singleton bundle. A brief discussion of this can be found in Appendix A.
For a set of nodes S in a graph G = (V, E), we let N (S) denote all nodes not in S that are neighbours of some node in S. For u ∈ V we let δ G (u) be all edges having u as an endpoint. Often the subscript G is omitted when it is clear from the context. For a subset of edges B, we let δ B (u) = δ(u) ∩ B, again when the graph G is clear from the context.
Again, we sometimes refer to an edge e by uv where u, v are the endpoints of e. For brevity, we may use notation like e = uv ∈ E when we want to consider an edge e ∈ E but also want to name the endpoints u, v of e as well. The reason for using this notation rather than simply saying uv ∈ E is that our local search algorithms do work for graphs with parallel edges (i.e. customers interested in identical bundles), so e would be one particular customer and u, v would name the items that e is interested in.
Given a function f : T → R on some finite set T , for any S ⊆ T we let f (S) denote
is a pricing of the vertices of a graph G = (V, E), for an edge e = uv ∈ E we let p(e) denote p(u) + p(v). For two pricings p, p : V → R ≥0 of the nodes of a graph, we let HW(p, p ) = |{v ∈ V : p(v) = p (v)}|, the number of vertices with different prices between p and p .
Finally, consider an instance G = (L ∪ R, E) of L-Sided Pricing where edges have budgets b e and vertices have capacities µ v . For any pricing p of the vertices, let val(p) = max F ⊆E and (p,F ) feasible e∈F p(e) be the maximum profit of a feasible solution with prices p. Note that val(p) can be computed in polynomial time as it is merely asking for a maximum-weight µ-matching solution using only edges e = uv with p(e) ≤ b e (the weight of such an edge being p(e)).
Reduction to L-Pricing
To begin, we use a reduction by Balcan and Blum [3] which was stated originally only for the uncapacitated case. We sketch the proof for completeness.
Lemma 1 (Balcan and Blum [3] ). If there is an α-approximation for L-Sided Pricing then there is a 4α-approximation problem for Capacitated Graph Pricing.
Proof. Let G = (V, E) be an instance of Capacitated Graph Pricing with capacities µ and budgets b. Randomly form L by including each vertex independently with probability 1/2 and set R = V − L. Discard all edges with both endpoints in the same set of the partition. Consider an optimum pricing p * for G and corresponding set of customers F * ⊆ E. Let F be the restriction of F * to edges e with endpoints in each of L and R and consider prices p where p (u) = p * (u) for u ∈ L and p (v) = 0 for v ∈ R. One can easily check E e∈F p (e) = 1 4 · e∈F * p * (e).
This can be efficiently derandomized because we only require pairwise independence of the events u ∈ L for various u ∈ V , see [17] for details behind this technique.
Local-Search Algorithms
We consider local-search algorithms for L-Sided Pricing. Recall we are given a bipartite graph G = (L ∪ R, E) where each v ∈ L ∪ R has a capacity µ v ≥ 0, each e ∈ E has a budget b e , and we are restricted to setting p(v) = 0 for each v ∈ R.
It is clear that there is an optimal solution p such that for each u ∈ L we have p(u) = b e for some e ∈ δ(u). Otherwise we could increase p(u) to the next budget of an edge touching u (or decrease, if p(u) exceeds all budgets of edges touching u) while not decreasing the value of the solution. So, for u ∈ L we define P u = {b e : e ∈ δ(u)} to be the set of budgets of customers interested in item u.
We run a local-search approximation based on this observation. Here, a vector p over L is a pricing if p(u) ∈ P u for each u ∈ L. The local-search algorithm iteratively tries to improve a pricing by changing the price of only one vertex until no such improvement is possible. The full algorithm is presented in Algorithm 1. Because a price p(u) is chosen from P u for each u ∈ L, it is clear that an iteration can be executed in polynomial time.
let p be any pricing while val(p ) > val(p) for some pricing p with HW(p, p ) = 1 do p ← p return p Call a pricing p locally optimal if it cannot be improved by changing the price for any u ∈ L, note Algorithm 1 returns a locally-optimal pricing. As is common in local search, we analyze the quality of a locally-optimal solution. In the next subsection we show val(p) ≥ val(p * )/2 where p * is an optimal pricing for the L-Sided Pricing instance.
The main concern is then the efficiency of the algorithm. Clearly each iteration can be executed in polynomial time but the number of iterations is not apparently bounded. We use a more recent observation from [10] to find a solution which may not be a local optimum but is still guaranteed to have value at least 1/2 of the optimum value (no -loss in the guarantee, like one would expect using older methods). The simple application of this trick is discussed in Appendix B.
Single-Swap Analysis
We fix p * to be some particular optimal pricing. For each u ∈ L, consider the local search step that changes the price of u from p(u) to p * (u). That is, consider p u where p u (u) = p * (u) and p u (u ) = p(u ) for u ∈ L − {u}. We refer to this swap as the p → p u swap. For brevity, let ∆ u := val(p u ) − val(p) and note ∆ u ≤ 0 because p is a local optimum. We provide a lower bound on ∆ u in a way that relates part of the global optimum with part of the local optimum.
First, construct a subset B ⊆ B * and an injective mapping σ : B → B iteratively as follows in Algorithm 2. Intuitively, it greedily pairs some edges in B * with edges in B sharing the same endpoint in R until no more pairs can be made. After this pairing, for Now we bound ∆ u . One possible matching with the modified prices p u is
A simple inspection of the definition of B and σ shows this is feasible. That is, it alters B by swapping δ B (u) for δ B * (u) and removes edges paired, via σ, with δ B * (u) to make room across nodes in R for these new edges. It could be that some edges in δ B * (u) are not paired by σ but this indicates their right-endpoints already have enough room already to accommodate these edges without removing other edges from B. So, B u respects the vertex capacities. Now, ∆ u represents the cost change when using the maximum value matching with the new profits. This can be bounded as follows, based on the fact that B u is a feasible solution under prices p u :
Summing over all u ∈ L and noting each e ∈ B has its corresponding term appearing in the last sum for at most one u ∈ L because σ is one-to-one shows 0 ≥ val(p * ) − 2 · val(p).
An Improved Multi-Swap Algorithm for Bounded Capacities
Here we consider the restriction of L-Sided Pricing to instances where µ u ≤ C for each u ∈ L for some fixed constant C. 1 Note we do not require capacities of v ∈ R to be bounded.
Let d ≥ 1 be a fixed integer: larger d will result in better approximation guarantees with a slower, but still polynomial-time, algorithm. The multi-swap algorithm we consider is given in Algorithm 3. Let ρ = 1 + C + C 2 + . . .
let p be any pricing while there is a pricing p with HW(p, p ) ≤ ρ and val(p ) > val(p) do p ← p return p
As before, call a pricing p locally optimal if val(p ) ≤ val(p) for any pricing p with HW(p, p ) ≤ ρ. Recall P u for u ∈ L is the set of distinct budgets of the edges incident to u and that, in L-Sided Pricing, we can assume any pricing p has p(u) ∈ P u for all u ∈ L. So, as C and d are constants, a single iteration can be executed in polynomial time by trying all subsets S ⊆ L of bounded size and, for each of those, trying all u∈S (|P u | − 1) ≤ |E| O(1) ways to change the prices of all u ∈ S. We prove the following approximation guarantee.
Theorem 10. Let p be a locally-optimal solution and p * a global optimum solution. Then
So for any fixed C ≥ 2 and > 0 we can choose d large enough to get a C 2C−1 −approximation for instances of L-Sided Pricing where all capacities of nodes in L are bounded by C. We can use the trick from Appendix B to ensure the number of iterations is polynomially-bounded.
We will soon prove Theorem 5 stated in Section 1.1. For now, we show how to complete the local search analysis using this result. Let p * denote an optimal pricing, B ⊆ E the edges bought in the local optimum p, and B * ⊆ E the edges bought under p * . Let σ : B → B be a pairing constructed in the same way as in the single swap analysis (using Algorithm 2) where B ⊆ B * .
To describe the swaps used in the analysis, first consider the following auxiliary directed graph H = (L, F ) whose nodes are the same as the left-side of this L-Sided Pricing instance and whose edges are given as follows. For any e * = uv ∈ B , let w ∈ L be the left-endpoint of σ(e * ). Add a directed edge from u to w in F .
Observe that both the indegree and outdegree of a vertex in H is at most C by this construction, so Theorem 5 applies. Let τ : L × {0, 1, . . . , d} be the given weighting of directed balls in H. These weights will be used to combine inequalities generated by the test swaps below.
Choosing the Test Swaps
For any u ∈ L and any 0 ≤ i ≤ d, consider the prices p u,i defined by
and note ∆ u,i ≤ 0 by local optimality. We bound the difference by explicitly describing a feasible set of edges B u,i , namely:
That is, add all edges from B * touching a vertex in the directed ball B + (u, i) and remove all edge from B that either touch B + (u, i) or are paired (via σ) with an edge in B that touches ∂B + (u, i). It is again easy to check that (p u,i , B u,i ) is a feasible solution: across u ∈ L we simply exchanged edges in B touching U for edges in B * touching u and we ensured any new e * ∈ B has σ(e * ) removed to make room for e * across its right-endpoint. Observe for any e * ∈ δ B (B + (u, i − 1)) that σ(e * ) is already removed when δ B (B + (u, i)) is removed from B, which is why the last part of the definition of B u,i only uses the boundary ∂B + (u, i) instead of all of B + (u, i) to remove the remaining edges of B that are paired with δ B (B + (u, i) ).
Weighting the inequalities by the values τ (u, i) from Theorem 5,
It remains to consider the contribution of each edge in B * and B to this bound if we sum over all u ∈ L, 0 ≤ i ≤ d. Observe an edge e = vw ∈ B * is "swapped in" in this analysis for the swap p → p u,i if and only if v ∈ B + (u, i). So by Theorem 5, the total contribution of p * (e) to u,i τ (u, i) · ∆ u,i is precisely C d+1 −1 C−1 · p * (e). On the other hand, an edge e = vw ∈ B is "swapped out" in this analysis for the swap
Again by Theorem 5, the total τ -weight of the first event is exactly C d+1 −1 C−1 and, if σ −1 (e) is defined, the total τ -weight of the second event is exactly C d . Thus,
which proves Theorem 10.
Proof of Theorem 5
Before presenting the full proof to conclude the analysis, we consider a simpler setting to develop intuition. Suppose, for each 0 ≤ i ≤ d and each u ∈ L there are precisely C i nodes w ∈ L with d H (w, u) = i. This would happen if, say, H has indegree and outdegree exactly C at each vertex and the undirected version of H has girth > 2d. Then setting τ (u, i) = 1 if i = d and 0 otherwise for each u ∈ L would suffice.
In the general setting without this assumption, we have to consider other directed balls B + (u, i) for different 0 ≤ i ≤ d and with, perhaps, larger weights than 1. This is because the radius-d balls B + (u, d) themselves for various u ∈ L do not cover each v ∈ L precisely d i=0 C i times.
Inductively define τ (u, i) for u ∈ L and 0 ≤ i ≤ d as follows:
The inspiration behind this construction is that in general we would have d H (u, v) = i for only at most C i nodes u. So we consider smaller directed balls to make up this deficiency. If we think that the distance i requirement for each v ∈ V is exactly C i , then for each Figure 1 for an illustration.
The recurrence above ensures the total contribution to the distance i requirement for each v by all all directed balls is exactly C i . We formalize this idea and show the τ values are nonnegative in Lemma 2 below. 
Proof. The equality is by construction and the observation that d H (v, u) = 0 if and only if v = u. The inequalities are proven inductively with the base case i = d being given. Now suppose for i < d we know 0 ≤ τ (u, j) ≤ C d−j for any i < j ≤ d and any u ∈ L. By the recurrence for τ (u, i) and because τ (v, j) ≥ 0 for any i < j ≤ d and v ∈ V , we see
That is, consider a shortest v − u path P in H, as i < j, we have v = u so the second-last node on this path is a node w whose distance to u is 1 (it could be w = v, if j − i = 1).
From this and using the equality from the first part of the theorem statement, we bound the double sum in the recurrence defining τ (u, i) by
The last bound follows as each v ∈ L has indegree at most C in H. Thus, from the recurrence again, we see τ (u, i) ≥ 0. 
Locality Gaps
For an instance of L-Sided Pricing and a value ρ ≥ 1, we say its locality gap with respect to the ρ-swap heuristic is the maximum of val(p * ) val(p) over pricings p that cannot be improved by changing the value of up to ρ entries p(v) where p * is any optimal pricing. That is, the locality gap is the worst possible approximation guarantee of a local optimum for that instance.
Single-Swap
Theorem 11. For any C ≥ 1 and > 0, there is an instance Φ = (G, µ, b) of L-Sided Pricing where all u ∈ L have capacity C and all v ∈ R have capacity 1 such that the locality gap of Φ is at least 2 − with respect to the single-swap heuristic.
Thus, our single-swap analysis is tight. While this is most striking when C = 1, we remark it is still interesting for larger C because it is not obvious, a priori, that the singleswap algorithm's analysis cannot be improved as the capacities in L increase.
Proof. For n ≥ 2, consider the graph G n,C = (L ∪ R, E), L = {u i : 1 ≤ i ≤ n} and R = {v i,j : 1 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤ j ≤ C}. The edges are the union of the edges on the paths P j = {u 1 , v 1,j , u 2 , v 2,j , . . . , u n , v n,j } for 1 ≤ j ≤ C. We use µ u = C for u ∈ L and µ v = 1 for v ∈ R.
The budgets are given as follows.
All edges in E LOC have a budget of 1 and all edges in E OP T have a budget of 2.
Using p * (u) = 2 for every vertex in L and corresponding edges E OP T is a solution with value of 2C(n − 1). Now consider the solution with p(u) = 1 for each vertex in L. This solution is just E LOC with a value of Cn, which can be seen to be the optimal matching under these prices because the capacity of every vertex in L is saturated by E LOC . Note val(p) = 1 2−2/n · val(p * ). We claim this is a local optimum with respect to the singleswap heuristic.
The only possible swap is to change the price of some u i to 2. If i = 1, this is clearly not an improving swap because no edge incident to u 1 can afford the new price and all other vertices are priced 1 so no matching has value ≥ n − 1. So suppose i ≥ 2.
The only edges incident to u i that can afford this new price are (u i , v i−1,j ) for all 1 ≤ j ≤ C. Furthermore, for any µ-matching B that does not use an edge e ∈ δ E OP T (u i ), we can get a better µ-matching (with respect to the new prices) by adding e to B and, if necessary, removing some edge of E LOC ∩ B sharing the right-endpoint with e.
Thus, the optimum matching after changing p(u) to 2 uses all of δ E OP T ∩B. After fixing these edges, which have total value 2C, it is easy to see the best matching we can get in the graph obtained by removing the endpoints of edges δ E OP T (u) ∩ B (plus all edges incident to these endpoints) has value at most C(n − 2). So this is not an improving swap.
Multi-Swap
Before presenting the lower bound, we describe a construction of a layered graph with high girth and particular degree bounds. The construction is depicted in Figure 2 .
Lemma 3. For any C ≥ 2, ρ ≥ 1 and t ≥ 1 there is a simple, layered, and bipartite graph G t = (L ∪ R, E) with consecutive layers L 1 , R 1 , L 2 , . . . , L t , R t where the subgraph induced by L i and R i is a (C, 1)-biregular bipartite graph and the subgraph induced by R i and L i+1 is a (1, C)-biregular bipartite graph (for each relevant i). Further, G t has girth exceeding 2t · ρ.
Note, this implies |L i | = |L|/t and |R i | = |R|/t = C · |L i | for each 1 ≤ i ≤ t.
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As H is (2C)-regular and connected it contains an Eulerian circuit. Direct all edges along this circuits so each vertex of H has indegree C and outdegree C. Finally, build a bipartite graph H = (A ∪ B, F ) where A and B are disjoint copies of V where u ∈ A and v ∈ B is an edge of F if uv is a directed edge obtained when we directed the Eulerian circuit.
Build the following layered graph G t = (L ∪ R, E). For each 1 ≤ i ≤ t, let L i be a set of size V and R i be a set of size |F |. Recall that both A and B in H are viewed as copies of V in H , so each L i can be viewed either as a copy of A or as a copy of B, when appropriate. Now, for each u ∈ A, each e ∈ δ H (u), and each layer 1 ≤ i ≤ t, add an edge in G t from the copy of u in L i to the copy of e in R i . Call the set of all such edges added for a given i E i . Similarly, for each v ∈ B, each e ∈ δ H (u), and each layer 1 ≤ i ≤ t − 1, add an edge in G t from the copy of e in layer R i to the copy of v in L i . Call the set of all such edges added for a given i E * i .
This construction is depicted in Figure 2 in Section 4.
To complete the analysis, consider a simple cycle C in G t . Note that C alternates between using nodes in L and nodes in R. Furthermore, if C uses nodes consecutive nodes a ∈ L i , b ∈ R j , c ∈ L k (where |j − i| ≤ 1 and |k − j| ≤ 1) then the nodes of H corresponding to a and c are connected by an edge in H that corresponds to node b. Thus, the cycle C corresponds to a circuit C of H t with |C | = |C|/2. Here, C may use an edge more than once so |C | measures the steps taken by the circuit C .
Consider any node a ∈ C ∩ L and say it is a copy of node v of H. Because the cycle C is simple in G t , then the two adjacent nodes b, b to a on C correspond to distinct edges in H incident to v. This is true for every a ∈ C ∩ L, so the set of nodes of H corresponding to nodes in C ∩ L are incident to at least two distinct edges traversed by C . That is, the edges used on the circuit C contain a cycle. As the girth of H is at least ρ · t, then |C| = 2 · |C | ≥ 2 · ρ · t.
Theorem 12. For all C ≥ 2, ρ ≥ 1 and > 0, there is an instance Φ = (G, µ, b) of L-Sided Pricing where all u ∈ L have capacity C and all v ∈ R have capacity 1 such the locality gap if Φ is at least 2C−1 C − with respect to the ρ-swap heuristic. That is, our bound on the locality gap for the multi-swap algorithm on instances with bounded capacity is tight.
Proof. Fix C ≥ 2, ρ ≥ 1, > 0 and let t be such that 2C−1
be the graph from Lemma 3 for these parameters C, ρ, t. For each 1 ≤ i ≤ t, let E i be the edges connecting L i to R i and for each 1 ≤ i < t let E * i be the edges connecting Figure 2 for an illustration. Let n be such that |L i | = n and |R i | = C · n for all 1 ≤ i ≤ t.
The optimum is at least (2C − 1) · C · (|L| − n), which can be seen by using edges E * where each vertex in L has a price of 2C − 1. Now consider the pricing p that uses price C for each vertex in L. The optimum set of edges to buy with these prices is E with a value of C · C · |L|. The proof of the following claim appears below. Claim 1. The pricing p is locally optimal with respect to the ρ-swap procedure.
If so, then the locality gap of this instance is as bad as
Proof of Claim 1. Consider any pricing p with HW(p, p ) ≤ ρ. Let X ⊆ L be the nodes v with p(v) = p (v). So p (v) = 2C − 1 for v ∈ X. If some vertex v ∈ X lies in L 1 = ∅ then no edge incident to v can afford the price 2C − 1, so we may assume that X ∩ L 1 = ∅.
We show val(p ) ≤ val(p). We first claim any optimal set of edges M * under this price includes all of δ E * (X) and excludes all of δ E (X). The latter is simple, no edge in δ E (X) can afford the price of its endpoint in L. Then if any e ∈ δ E * (X) is missing from M * , we can get an even better solution by adding e and removing, if necessary, an edge of E ∩ M sharing its R-endpoint with e. The value increases by at least (2C − 1) − C = C − 1.
So M * contains all edges of δ E * (X) with value 2C − 1 each plus some edges in δ(L − X) (which could be in either E or E * ) with value C each. We then see the value of M * is
The rest of the proof focuses on showing the following:
If this holds, we can bound 2 by C · C · |L| thus showing val(p ) ≤ val(p).
To show 3, first consider the graph G obtained from G t by directing all edges to higher layers: so an edge in E i is directed from L i to R i and an edge in E * i is directed from L i to R i+1 . Let S consist of R t plus all nodes reachable from X in G , including X itself. We claim |δ in G (S)| = C · n. This can be seen easily:
The first equality holds because δ out G (S) = ∅ by construction of S, the second holds for any cut of any directed graph, and the third holds because S ∩ L 1 = ∅ (as X ∩ L 1 = ∅) and because every vertex not in L 1 or R t has equal in-and out-degree. Now let Y be all endpoints of edges in δ E * (X) and let G be the subgraph of G obtained by deleting Y and incident edges. Let S = S − Y , we claim |δ G (S )| ≤ n · C − (C − 1) · |X|. One should think that δ G (S ) is obtained by deleting edges of δ in G (X)∩δ in G (S) from δ in G (S). There are precisely C · |X| edges in δ in G (X), we show at least (C − 1) · |X| of there were also in δ in G (S). To that end, consider an edge e ∈ δ in G (x) for some x ∈ X that does not lie in δ in G (S). Then v is reachable from some other node of X in G by construction of S, pick the deepest such node and call this node τ (e). By this choice for τ (e), there is a τ (e) − x path in G that avoids every other vertex in X. Also, the length of this path is at most 2t because the paths are monotone with respect to the layers of G . Also note for two different e, e ∈ δ in G (x) − δ in G (S) that τ (e) = τ (e ), or else we have two different τ (e) − x walks implying there is a cycle of length at most 4t in G t which is not possible.
Build an auxiliary graph T = (X, F ) where for each e ∈ δ in G (x) − δ in G (S) for some x ∈ X we include an undirected edge from τ (e) to x in F . By the above discussion, this is a simple graph. We also claim it is a forest, otherwise consider a cycle C in T . Focus on some edge xy ∈ C and let z / ∈ {x, y} be another node in C. As the xy-path from the construction in the last paragraph avoids z, we get two different x − y walks in G t by following the paths corresponding to the two directions around C from x to y. But this is impossible because G t has no cycle of length at most 2t · |X| ≤ 2t · ρ. So, |F | ≤ |X| − 1 meaning
Now we can prove 3. Let G be the undirected version of G , so G is obtained from G t by deleting Y and its incident edges from G t . Call a subset of edges of G a matching if they satisfy the capacity constraints of nodes in G . Note δ M * (L − X) is a matching.
We bound the size of a maximum matching in G . First, observe M := E * − δ(X) is a matching in G and that G is the directed graph we get by directing edges along this matching. That is, the set of L 1 −R t paths in G are exactly the set of M -alternating path. By the max-flow/min-cut theorem, the maximum number of edge-disjoint M -alternating paths is at most |δ in G (S )| ≤ C · n − (C − 1) · |X|. So the maximum size of a matching in G is at most
This proves 3 and completes the analysis of the locality gap.
LP-Based Approximations
So far, our focus has been on approximations based on local search. Here, we consider linear programming relaxations for L-Sided Pricing. Recall for each u ∈ L that P u = {b e : e ∈ δ(u)} is a set of possible prices for vertex u: there is an optimal solution that selects p(u) from P u for each u ∈ L.
For u ∈ L and p ∈ P u , we let y u,p be a variable indicating we select price p for u. Similarly, for each e = uv ∈ E and p ∈ P u such that p ≤ b e , we let x e,p be a variable indicating edge e is selected and vertex u is assigned price p (so e buys their bundle at price p). The following relaxation provides an upper bound on the optimal solution to the given instance of the L-Sided Pricing. x e,p ≤ y u,p · µ u ∀ u ∈ L, p ∈ P u (6)
x, y ≥ 0
Constraints 5 indicate one price must be selected for each u ∈ L, 6 ensures the capacity constraints for u ∈ L are satisfied and 7 ensures the capacity constraints for v ∈ R are satisfied, 8 ensures we must set the price of u to p if we are to have e pay p.
Randomized Rounding Algorithms
We first show in simple graphs with large capacities for R, the integrality gap is close to 1.
Theorem 13. For > 0, the integrality gap of (LP-Pricing) is 1 − 2 in simple graphs when µ v ≥ 3 ln(1/ )/ 2 + 1 for all v ∈ R.
Proof. Consider the following randomized rounding algorithm. For each u ∈ L, sample a price p (u) ∈ P u from the distribution with Pr[p (u) = p] = y u,p . This is a distribution by 5 and nonnegativity of y. For brevity, we will let p (e) = p (u) for an edge e = uv.
Then define a fractional matching in G as follows. The idea is that we want to assign a value of x e,p (e) /y u,p (e) to each edge, this is at most 1 by 8. By 6 this fractional matching would always satisfy the capacity constraints for nodes in L. But it may violate constraints for nodes in R. The obvious solution would be to scale each of these fractional values to be a feasible matching satisfying all vertex constraints. We take a simpler view which is sufficient for our purposes, we scale all resulting values by 1 − , and then outright discard edges e = uv where the capacity of v is still violated after this scaling.
More precisely, for each e = uv we first let x e = (1 − ) ·
x e,p (e) y u,p (e) (using 0 if p (e) > b e ). Then for each edge e = uv, we define
So, by integrality of the bipartite µ-matching polytope, val(p ) ≥ e p · x e as there is an integral matching obtaining at least as much value as the fractional matching x .
For any e = uv ∈ E let B e be the bad event that e =u v∈δ(v),e =e x e ≥ µ v − 1. Notice that the second case in the definition of x e applies only if event B e happens. We show Pr[B e ] ≤ . If so, for each e = uv ∈ E the fact that B e is independent of the choice of p (e) (as G is a simple graph) we then have
Summing over all edges, E e∈E p (e) · x e ≥ (1 − 2 ) · e=uv p∈Pu p · x e,p , as required. To bound Pr[B e ], for an edge e let X e denote the random variable with value (1 − ) · x e ,p (u) /y u ,p (e ) and let X e = e ∈δ(v),e =e X e . Then E[X e ] = (1 − ) · p∈P u x e ,p so by
Again by simplicity of G, the random variables X e are independent for different e ∈ δ(v), e = e. Let Y = (1− )·(µ v −1). As Y ≥ E[X e ] and 0 < < 1, by a standard Chernoff bound (eg. Theorem 1.1 in [8] 
The fact that G was simple was used in the application of the Chernoff bound. The random variables X e for edges in δ(v) for some v ∈ R are independent if G is simple.
In fact, this proof generalizes to providing a constant bound on the integrality gap for any instance, even if capacities are small or there are parallel edges. Simply modify the proof to first set x e = 1 2 · Lemma 4. The integrality gap of (LP-Pricing) no worse than 1/4 in any instance of L-Sided Pricing.
The choice of 1/2 in the definition of x e is optimal for this analysis. Note, this approximation guarantee is even worse than our single-swap algorithm.
Proof of Theorem 3
Here we combine the results from Theorem 4 and 8 (or Theorem 13) to provide a better than 2-approximation for the instances with uniform capacities, where all vertices w ∈ L∪R have capacity µ w = C. This is obtained using a slightly more refined analysis of the randomized rounding procedure. We used simpler Chernoff bounds in the proof of Theorem 13 to keep the bound simpler to state since the main the goal was to show the guarantee for L-Sided Pricing approaches 1 as C increases. But since we are interested in optimal constants at this point, we analyze a tighter Chernoff bound.
Theorem 14. The randomized rounding procedure produces a solution for L-Sided Pricing with expected profit at least 0.516 · OP T LP in simple graphs where all capacities are at least 22.
Proof. Let α := 0.57. In the analysis of the randomized rounding procedure, we explicitly constructed a fractional matching after sampling all of the prices. In this proof, we let x e = α · x e,p (e) /y u,p (e) for each edge e after sampling p .
For each v ∈ R, each e ∈ δ(v) has x e being a random value between 0 and 1. Set v := c−1 α·c − 1, so that (1 + v ) · α · µ v = µ v − 1. Since these are independent for different e and since the expected value of x (δ(v)) is at most α · µ v , then by a Chernoff bound we have for any e ∈ δ(v) that
Now, as a function of µ v the right hand side increases as µ v decreases. Since we assumed µ v ≥ 22, we evaluate this at µ v = 22 to get for any µ v ≥ 22 that
First, suppose S is a vertex cover of G with |S| = k. Consider the pricing p with p(l i ) = 1 if l i ∈ S and p(l i ) = 2 if l i / ∈ S. As S is a vertex cover in G, for each e j = v i v k ∈ E we have at least one of l i d j or l k d j is incident to a vertex with price 1. Form F ⊆ E by adding one such edge from each e j and adding all node customers. We get profit m from edge customers, profit 2(n − k) from all node customers l i r i such that v i / ∈ S, and profit k from all node customers l i r i with v i ∈ S for a total profit of m + 2n − k.
Conversely, consider an optimal pricing p, so each price is 1 or 2. For e j = v i v k ∈ E, we claim that either p(v i ) = 1 or p(v k ) = 1. If not, then consider changing p(v i ) to 1. We lost a profit of 1 from the node customer l i r i but have gained a profit of 1 by adding v i d j , which remains feasible because neither v i d j nor v k d j could afford the price of their left-endpoint before (i.e. d j is not used by any edge that can afford their price under pricing p, so we may add v i d j after adjusting prices).
Set S = {v i : p(l i ) = 1}. By the above argument, S is a vertex cover of G. Also observe that the optimal set of edges of G under prices p will include every node customer plus exactly one from each pair
Therefore, the optimal profit in G is exactly 5 2 · n − k where k is the size of a minimum vertex cover of G. There are constants 0 < α < β < 1 such that it is NP-hard to distinguish between 3-regular graphs having vertex covers of size ≤ α ·n and 3-regular graphs requiring vertex covers of size ≥ β · n. So it is NP-hard to distinguish between L-Sided Pricing instances that have optimal profit at least 5 2 − α · n or at most 5 2 − β · n.
Conclusion
We presented an 8-approximation for Capacitated Graph Pricing. If all capacities were bounded from above by a constant or, in simple graphs, were bounded from below by a sufficiently large constant then we get slightly better approximations. It would be nice to combine these two cases in a more clever way to beat the 8-approximation in any Capacitated Graph Pricing instance without an assumption on the uniformity of the vertex capacities, even if only for simple graphs. But the techniques we use are quite different and it is not clear how to combine them in a single algorithm that works in the presence of both small and large capacities. It would also be interesting to know if the hardness lower bound for Capacitated Graph Pricing is worse than 4. Intuitively, this could be the case as the L-Sided Pricing problem we reduce to is APX-hard in the capacitated case.
We also briefly remark that it is simple to get an LP-based O(k 2 )-approximation for the generalization of Capacitated Graph Pricing to hypergraphs where each hyperedge has size ≤ k by first reducing to a bipartite hypergraph where we are only allowed to use nonzero prices on one side L and each hyperedge has only one vertex in L (losing an O(k) in the guarantee [3] ) and then using standard randomized rounding of the obvious generalization of our LP to this setting while losing only an additional O(k) factor. This problem is a common generalization of the uncapacitated case which has a hardness of Ω(k 1− ) [6] , and the k-Set Packing problem which has a hardness of Ω(k/ log k) [14] . One then wonders if Capacitated Graph Pricing in hypergraphs could be hard to approximate better than Ω(k 2− ). It would be interesting to determine if this is the case or to see if there is a noticeably better approximation than O(k 2 ), perhaps even O(k).
B Efficient Versions of Local Search
The standard trick to make local search algorithms efficient is to only make an improvement if it is somewhat noticeable. That is, a swap is performed only if it improves the cost by a factor of at least 1 + /∆ where ∆ is the total "weight" of all inequalities generated by test swaps to complete the analysis (typically, ∆ is polynomial in the input size). See [2] for a specific example of this approach.
However, such analysis typically "loses an " in the approximation guarantee. We adapt an alternative approach outlined in [10] that avoids this -loss while still achieving the same approximation guarantee that a true local optimum is proven to have. We consider the single-swap algorithm first, the extension to the multi-swap algorithm is in Section B.1.
Recall that the proof of Theorem 9 described a set of test swaps and placed a bound on the cost change. That is, for each u ∈ L the swap p → p u is considered and a bound ∆ u on the change in val() was given as ∆ u ≥ p * (u) · |δ B * (u)| − p(u) · |δ B (u)| − e∈δ B (u) p(σ(e)).
Observe this bound holds even if p is not a local optimum solution. The only place in the proof of Theorem 9 that used the fact that p was a local optimum was in asserting 0 ≥ ∆ u , which is not required here.
Summing the above over all u ∈ L shows u∈L ∆ u ≥ val(p * ) − 2 · val(p).
Thus, the u ∈ L with largest ∆ u satisfies ∆ u ≥ val(p * ) − 2 · val(p) |L| .
So if we take the best improvement in each step of the algorithm, the next price p then satisfies val(p ) ≥ val(p) + val(p * ) − 2 · val(p) |L| .
Consider the potential function Φ(p) := val(p * ) − 2 · val(p). If Φ(p) > 0, then Φ(p ) ≤ 1 − 2 |L| · Φ(p) follows from the expression above. That is, Φ(p) decreases by a factor of exp(−1) after every |L|/2 iterations as long as the current price p satisfies Φ(p) > 0.
With the standard assumption that the budgets b e are expressed as rational numbers in the input, after a polynomial number of iterations (in the total bit complexity of the input), we will reach a solution p with Φ(p) ≤ 0, i.e. val(p) ≥ val(p * )/2 as required, provided we take the best improvement in each step.
B.1 Extension to multi-swap
Each swap of the form p → p u,r for 0 ≤ i ≤ d and u ∈ L in the analysis was weighted with a value 0 ≤ τ (u, r) ≤ C d−r . Let κ = C d+1 −1 C−1 · |L|, so κ is an upper bound on the total weight of all test swaps and κ = O(|L|) as C and d are constants.
Again, even if p is not a local optimum our analysis still shows u∈L,0≤r≤d
τ (u, r) · (val(p u,r ) − val(p)) ≥
Local optimality of p was only used to show the left-hand side was not positive. Without local optimality, we may still conclude the most improving swap p → p satisfies val(p ) ≥ val(p)
Consider the potential function
The above bound shows if φ(p) > 0 then choosing the best improving swaps will result in a solution p with φ(p ) ≤ 1 − C d+1 −1 C−1 + C d · 1 κ · φ(p). So φ(p) decreases geometrically every O(κ) iterations as long as it remains positive. As κ = O(|L|) and by using rationality of the input values, the potential φ(p) will become nonpositive after a polynomial number of iterations in the total bit complexity of the input as long as we take the most improving swap.
